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PRESUMED REPRESENTED: ANALYZING 

INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT WHEN THE 

GOVERNMENT IS A PARTY 

INTRODUCTION 
Massachusetts law prohibits any firm or person from owning 
more than three retail liquor 'stores within the Commonwealth.1 In 
response, small retail liquor stores, often family-owned, have joined 
together and created a trade association to protect their legal inter­
ests.2 Subsequently, a private trade association representing huge, 
national, multi-outlet food retailers (i.e., Stop & Shop and BJ's) 
sues the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission 
created by the statute for antitrust violations and for the removal of 
the restriction on the number of liquor licenses that any firm or 
person can own in Massachusetts.3 Stop & Shop alone owns ninety­
three retail outlets in the Commonwealth but only three liquor li­
censes.4 The association of independent retail package stores 
moves to intervene with the Commission to stop unlimited liquor 
licenses for chain stores from driving independent stores out of bus­
iness. While the association's economic interest is sufficient to be 
considered, the court denies the intervention. The Commission, 
pledged to uphold the statute "f9r the better regulation and control 
of such traffic [of alcoholic beverages] and for the promotion of 
temperance in use of such beverages,"S is deemed to adequately 
represent the interest of the association. This is an example of pri­
vate parties seeking to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civi~ Procedure. with a governmental entity that directly 
regulates them, but who are unable to do so because the govern­
ment is presumed to represent them adequately. 
Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) allows an appli­
cant to intervene unless the existing parties in a suit adequately re­
present the applicant's interests. After the first two requirements 
1. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 15 (1998). 
2. See Mass. Food Ass'n v. Sullivan, 184 F.R.D. 217, 219 (D. Mass. 1999). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
.131 
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of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) have been satisfied,6 interven­
tion hinges on whether the existing representation is adequate. 
This determination is based on the interests of both the existing 
governmental party and the proposed intervenor. When should a 
court presume that a regulating governmental entity adequately 
represents the interests of those it regulates? Should such a pre­
sumption exist? 
An inherent conflict exists between the regulator and the regu­
lated due to the divergent Il<.lture of their interests. The govern­
ment, as a regulatory entity, represents the general public good 
while the regulated intervenor is often representing its individual 
economic interests. For example, a regulatory agency, such as the 
Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages' Control Commission, created 
by statute7 with commissioners appointed by the governor,8 defends 
the statute. The regulated individual businesses, bearing the direct 
economic impact of any decisions regarding the statute, cannot be 
parties to the suit unless they are able to intervene. 
Some jurisdictions presume the government entity cannot re­
present private parties adequately because of their regulatory na­
ture, while others presume exactly. the opposite. This Note will 
examine how the opposing presumptions developed, the current 
state of the law, and how the proposed analytical framework for the 
courts should be changed. The analytical framework returns the fo­
cus of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) to the actual interests of the 
government entity and the intervening party and to how these inter­
ests relate to each other. In the case outlined above, the interven­
ors' arguments and the court's analysis would center around how 
the trade association of independent liquor stores has an economic 
interest that is direct·and meaningful enough to warrant a consider­
ation separate and distinct from the general public interest the 
Commission represents. The new framework suggested in this Note 
reorients the analysis to the particular interests of the parties in­
volved, shifting it away from preliminary presumptions based on 
the nature of the parties. 
Part I of this Note discusses Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court decisions interpreting this Rule, 
and the historical development of standards among the federal cir­
6. FED. R. eIV. P. 24(a)(2) (claiming "an interest relating to the property or trans­
action ... [and] that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest ...."). 
7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 15 (1998). 
8. Mass. Food Ass'n, 184 F.R.D. at 222. 
2002] PRESUMED REPRESENTED 133 

cuits. Part II discusses the current circuit split.9 Finally, Part III 
analyzes the intended purpose of intervention as of right under 
Rule 24(a)(2), discusses reasons for the difference in standards, and 
proposes a new analytical framework that incorporates and unites 
the divergent standards. 
I. HISTORY 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow two kinds of inter­
vention for entities that are involved in, but not already made a 
party to a lawsuit.lO Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure permits intervention as of rightll and permissive interven­
tion.12 The two are often pleaded together to allow intervenors to 
gain entry into the suit either as of right or, failing that, by the 
court's discretion.13 
A. The Rule and Its Amendments 
Rule 24 of the· Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was initially 
adopted in 1937.14 The original Rule 24(a)(2) allowed intervention 
as of right for a party who could be bound by the judgment when 
the existing representation is or may be inadequate.15 In 1966, the 
Supreme Court16 amended the Rule to address some disparities 
9. Maine v. Dir. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 262 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001) (presump­
tion); Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2(01) (presumption 
only when same ultimate objective); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 
2000) (no presumption); Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458 (11th Cir. 1999) (weak 
presumption for same ultimate objective); Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964 
(3d Cir. 1998) (presumption); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106 (5th Cir. 1996) (no 
presumption); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996) (presumption); Forest 
Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3~ 1489 (9th Cir. 1995) (presumption); 
Dimond v. Dist. of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179 (D.C. 1986) (no presumption). 
to. FED. R. CIv. P. 24; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 19 (Joinder of Persons Needed for 
Just Adjudication); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (Permissive Joinder of Parties); FED. R. CIv. P. 
23 (Class Actions). 
11. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a). 
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) ("Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional 
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have 
a question of law or fact in common."). 
13. This Note will only address a particular instance of intervention as of right­
when a regulated entity is trying to intervene with its regulator. 
14. FED. R. CIv. P. 24. 
15. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend­
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 401 (1967). 
16. See 28 U.S.c. § 2073(b) (2000) (The Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure). 
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that had developed after its inceptionP The amended Rule 
24(a)(2) defines intervention as of right as allowing parties to 
intervene: 
When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is 
so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented 
by existing parties.1s 
The Advisory Committee intended the Rule to be liberally 
construed; a party whose ability to protect its interest would be af­
fected by the disposition of the matter should be able to represent 
the interest without a presumption against it.19 Indeed, the appli­
cant is usually the best judge of whether its interests are being rep­
resented adequately, particuli:lfly since it would assume the costs of 
participating in the litigation as a party.20 
1. Amendment to Rule 24(a) 
Analysis of Rule 24 must incorporate both the historical signif­
icance of the kinds of lawsuits in which intervention has been at­
tempted and the amendment of the original Rule.21 The Supreme 
Court created the original Rule 24(a)22 to allow intervention where 
a non-party could be bound under res judicata to the resolution of 
the suit, provided that the existing parties were not adequately rep­
resenting the non-party's interests.23 -Since the non-party's interest 
was critical and there was no adequate alternative, the intervention 
was as of right and gave the intervenor full status as a party.24 
Following the adoption of the original Rule 24, some courts 
17. The original Rule 24(a)(3) needed to be extended and the "binding" part re­
moved, so the subdivision (a)(2) was changed to reflect when an applicant qualified for 
intervention. The adequate representation requirement remained since it could be de­
cided in the character and at the time of the litigation. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 403. 
The 1966 amendments changed the wording of the rule from "when" the representation 
"is or may be" inadequate to "unless" the interest "is" adequately represented and 
moved the clause to the end of the sentence. 26 FED. !>Roc. § 59:300 (2001). 
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
19. 7C CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIv. 2D § 1909 (1986). 
20. Id. 
21. John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 
Ky. L.J. 329, 331 (1969). 
22. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 2071-2074 (2000). 
23. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 333. 
24. Id. at 334. 
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interpreted the Rule to allow in parties who would be practically 
affected but who did not qualify for intervention under the Rule's 
criteria.25 Other courts did not allow intervention when they 
thought it best to conclude the litigation without intervenor 
interference.26 
The restriction of res judicata was the primary criticism of Rule 
24(a); a party had to be bound by the lawsuit's resolution to inter~ 
vene.27 The criticism emerged in· part from cases of class actions or 
trusts where the extent to which parties were bound by the action 
was hard to determine.28 In response, the Supreme Court amended 
the Rule in 1966 and changed the wording from "is or may be 
bound by a judgment in the action"29 to "disposition' of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
[his] interest ...."30 In conjunction, the Supreme Court amended 
Federal Rules 19 and 23 to clarify, respectively, the persons needed 
for just adjudication and class actions.31 The amendments ex­
panded the right to intervene and, although creating potentially 
more complex litigation, furthered judicial administration through 
the consolidation of separate lawsuits.32 
The 1966 amendments to Rule 24(a)(2) also rephrased the re­
quirement of adequate representation. Before 1966, the Rule read 
"when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing par­
ties is or may be inadequate ...."33 The amendments modified it to 
read "unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties,"34 and moved the phrase to the end of the sen­
tence. Previously, the. intervenor had to show that the representa­
tion at least might be inadequate; after the amendment, the Rule 
states that intervention, assuming the requisite factors have been 
met, is allowed only if the court is persuaded that the representa­
tion of existing parties is in fact inadequate.35 
25. Id.; see Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960) (interpreting the standing 
requirement broadly to allow in intervenors). 
26. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 336; see Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 
U.S. 683 (1961) (espousing the restricted intervention). 
27. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 336. 
28. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., 1998 CIVIL PROCEDURE SUPPLEMENT 76-77 (1998). 
29. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 334. 
30. Id. at 337. 
31. David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, 
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 729 (1968). 
32. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 343. 
33. Id. at 333-34. 
34. Id. at 337. 
35. Id. 
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According to the Advisory Committee's notes, the general pur­
pose of the previous Rule 24(a)(2) was to allow a party to intervene 
if there was a "fair probability that the representation was inade­
quate. "36 Since the intervenor bears the burden of proving inade­
quacy and is the best judge of determining whether the 
representation is inadequate, the court may apply the standard lib­
erally in favor of allowing intervention.37 The amended Rule re­
quires that the intervenor show, as its final requirement, the higher 
standard that the existing representation is inadequate leaving only 
a short step to the further presumption that a government entity 
adequately represents them. On the other hand, some courts have 
opposed the higher standard when government entities are involved 
because the presumption does not exist in the wording of Rule 
24(a)(2).38 Thus, the seeds for the later circuit split were sown. 
B. Supreme Court Interpretation . 
The Supreme Court leniently interpreted the requirement of 
inadequacy of representation for Rule 24(a)(2) in Trbovich v. 
United Mine Workers.39 In Trbovich, the Secretary of Labor 
brought an action to set aside a union election and a union member 
sought to intervene as of right.40 The Court found that the pro­
posed intervenor satisfied the Rule if it showed that existing repre­
sentation "may be" inadequate.41 The burden to make that 
showing was minima1.42 The dual roles of the Secretary of Labor 
mirrored the two interests that a governmental entity represents, 
public and private.43 
These dual roles illustrate the dichotomy that a governmental 
entity and an intervening, regulated party face. A government 
party must protect its own interests in addition to the interests of 
those it is charged with representing, and they may not be precisely 
36. COUND, supra note 28, at 76. 
37. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 354; see Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967) ("While the change in wording does not relate to any change in standard as 
such, it underscores both the burden on those opposing intervention to show the ade­
quacy of the representation and the need for a liberal application in favor of permitting 
intervention. "). 
38. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. EI Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135 
(1967); Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and 
the Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 298 (1999). 
39. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972). 
40. Id. at 529-30. 
41. Id. at 538. 
42. Id. at 539. 
43. Id. at 538-39. 
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the same interests. In Trbovich, the Secretary had a duty to re­
present individual union members as their lawyer in actions against 
their union. Yet, his public duty to assure democratic elections is 
broader than the interest of an individual union member.44 Be­
cause the functions were different, they did not require the same 
approach in litigation. Therefore, the Secretary would not be ade­
quately representing the union members, and the Court allowed in­
tervention as of right under Rule 24(a).45 
After Trbovich, the Supreme· Court again ruled on interven­
tion, this time sustaining the denial of an intervention motion be­
cause it was untimely.46 The State of New York brought a suit 
against the United States seeking a judgment that some counties' 
voting qualifications did not fall under the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 and were, therefore, not suspended.47 The United States re­
sponded that it was without sufficient knowledge to determine 
whether literacy tests were administered discriminatorily.48 New 
York moved for summary judgment and the United States con­
sented to declaratory judgment; whereupon, the NAACP filed its 
motion to intervene. 
The Court ruled that the motion was not timely49 and only 
mentioned adequate representation to note that the claim of inade­
quate representation had not been unsubstantiated.50 However, the 
dissent in NAACP v. New York felt that the motion was timely and 
that the issue of adequate representation was key.51 While "[i]t is 
assumed, of course, that the United States adequately represents 
the public interest in cases of this sort," the United States, in this 
case, clearly was not adequately representing the public interest be­
cause it was not contesting the suit.52 For this reason, intervention 
should have been allowed,53 despite the assumption that the United 
44. ld. 
45. ld. at 539. 
46. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973). 
47. ld. at 348-49. 
48. ld. at 349. 
49. TImeliness is a preliminary requirement for Rule 24(a)(2) before adequate 
representation is judged. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
50. NAACP, 413 U.S. at 368. 
51. ld. at 374 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
52. ld. at 372 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
53. ld. (Douglas, J., dissenting); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135 (1967) ("[W]here the enforcement of a public law also 
demands distinct safeguarding of private interests by giving them a formal status in the 
decree, the power to enforce rights thus sanctioned is not left to the public authorities 
nor put in the keeping of the district court's discretion.") (citing Missouri-Kansas Pipe 
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States should adequately represent the public in a clear example of 
sovereign protection. 54 
More recently, the Supreme Court mentioned intervention as 
of right in a proceeding Nebraska brought against Wyoming and 
Colorado regarding a 1945 decree rationing water from the North 
Platte River among the three states.55 The United States, also a 
party, raised the issue that individual water storage contractors 
could try to intervene in the instant proceedings. 56 The Court 
stated that the states are presumed to speak for the interests of 
their citizens and individual intervenors would be denied without a 
showing of "some compelling interest in [their] own right, apart 
from [their interests] in a class with all other citizens and creatures 
of the state" where the interest was not properly represented 
already.57 
Based on the concept of state sovereign power, the presump­
tion was ordinarily applied to suits by one state against another in a 
suit under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.58 The 
presumption was used to prevent the opening of litigation to indi­
vidually represent all state citizens; however, an individual with a 
distinct interest separable from the general public should still be 
able to participate in the part of the litigation pertaining to that 
interest.59 The development ot' a presumption in favor of state's 
Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 506 (1941». But see Cascade Natural Gas, 386 
U.S. at 149 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A fortiori, intervention is improper when a pri­
vate party appears in order to vindicate his theory of public interest in an action 
brought by the Government."). 
54. NAACP, 413 U.S. at 370 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of i970 were specifically aimed at New York ...."). 
55. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 1 (1995). 
56. Id. at 21. 
57. Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted). 
58. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 173 (1930) ("A state suing, or sued, in this 
Court, by virtue of the original jurisdiction over controversies between States, must be 
deemed to represent all its citizens .... Citizens ... of either State, without a showing 
of any further ... interest, have no separate individual right to contest ... the [state's] 
position ...."); see also New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) ("An inter­
venor whose state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compel­
ling interest in his own right ...."). But cf Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 
(1983) (permitting permissive intervention for Indian Tribes over water rights even 
though the States argued that the United States already adequately represented the 
tribes because the tribes at least met the criteria for permissive intervention and they 
would be bound by any judgment in the suit). 
59. Kentucky, 281 U.S. at 173-74 ("This gives an individual defendant in such a 
suit between States full opportunity to litigate the only question which concerns him 
individually as distinguished from the questions which concern him only in common 
with all the citizens of his State."). 
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representation, in state suits within the Supreme Court, is not at 
odds with the liberal standard of Trbovich because it is clearly in an 
area of sovereign interest, such as water rights, and the potential 
intervenor has an opportunity ~o show how its interests may differ 
from the public interest. 
C. Shift in Burden 
The courts do not agree on whether the amended version of 
the Rule represents a shift in burden. Some have taken the 1966 
change to suggest a shift in burden, requiring those opposing inter­
vention to show adequate representation.60 Others have rejected 
this assumption, implicitly or explicitly, in keeping with Trbovich, 
which stated that the burden is with the applicant but should be 
treated as minima1.61 Still others remain unsure whether the 1966 
amendments created a burden shift.62 
D. Standard for Adequate Representation 
After Trbovich, in cases where the existing party was a govern­
ment entity, the courts' interpretations of the adequate representa­
tion standard began to diverge. Some circuits adopted and built on 
the idea that a government entity should be presumed to represent 
adequately a non-party that it is responsible for or regulates. The 
presumption is inconsistent with Trbovich because Trbovich only 
requires that the applicant shows that the representation "may be" 
inadequate and the burden of making that showing is minima1.63 
The Court specifically rejected the presumption that the inter­
60. WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 314-23; Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 181 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) ("As the conditional wording of Rule 24(a)(2) suggests by permitting inter­
vention 'unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties, the 
burden (is) on those opposing intervention to show the adequacy of the existing repre­
sentation."') (citing Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967»; Shapiro, supra 
note 31, at 741 n.91 ("The intervener's load seems to have been lightened by a language 
change in the rule which may shift the burden on this issue to those opposing interven­
tion."); cf. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 353-54. 
61. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528,538 (1972); Cascade Nat­
ural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1967); Blake v. Pallan, 
554 F.2d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that most courts have not adopted the burden 
shift). 
62. 26 FED. PROC. § 59:300 (1999); see Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131, 
133 (D.C. Minn. 1966) (noting that plausible arguments exist for both sides of the con­
troversy and listing factors that should be considered, including the general policy of 
liberalizing the Rule, who is in a better position to bear the burden, and the new word­
ing of the Rule). 
63. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972). 
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venor's interest must be considered adequately represented unless 
the Secretary has failed to perform his duties.64 Other appellate 
courts have decided that the inherent conflict between a govern­
ment entity and those it regulates or controls prohibited such a pre­
sumption and allowed intervention more liberally. 
The decisions, building on earlier decisions, developed in three 
stages. The first stage was an almost per se intervention because 
the interests are inherently different. The second stage began to 
presume that government representation was adequate but the in­
tervenors had a minimal burden to show that they had different 
interests and therefore were not adequately represented. The third 
stage continued the presumption favoring government representa­
tion but raised the burden of rebuttal, requiring intervenors to show 
actual inadequate representation. Some circuits continue to use the 
earlier rationale that the interests are inherently dissimilar enough 
to make the representation inadequate, creating the current circuit 
split. 
1. Development of Reasoning 
a. First Stage: Per Se Intervention 
Soon after Trbovich, the Tenth Circuit ruled on the amended 
Rule 24(a)(2) in a case challenging the constitutionality of statutes 
governing the Interstate Commerce Commission in which common 
carriers were trying to intervene.65 The court determined that the 
petitioners must show that the representation "may be" inadequate, 
but the burden was slight.66 The conflict between the petitioners' 
private interests and the government-protected public interest satis­
fied the burden.67 The government's representation of both of 
these interests at once would be "a task which is on its face impossi­
ble. "68 The Trbovich standard, with a minimal burden, is overcome 
with a general but fundamental difference of interests integral to 
the nature of the parties.69 
In 1986, the Circuit for the District of Columbia examined in 
64. Id. 
65. Nat'l Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 382 (10th 
Cir. 1977). 
66. Id. at 383. 
67. Id. (stating briefly that the government agency is seeking to protect the public 
interest and the private interest of the intervenors). 
68. Id. 
69. See id. at 384 (deciding that the respective interests represent the kind of 
conflict that satisfies the minimal burden). 
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more depth the inherent conflict between public and private inter­
ests. In Dimond v. District of Columbia,70 an automobile accident 
victim had brought a claim challenging the District of Columbia's 
no-fault insurance law.71 State Farm, as the insurer, sought to inter­
vene because it expected a savings from the statutory limitations on 
payments for non-economic lossesJ2 The court stated that the bur­
den to show adequate representation is on the intervenor but is not 
"onerous," and the representation does not have to be in fact 
inadequate.73 
A government entity must represent the public interests of all 
its citizens, but the District of Columbia did not have a financial 
interest in the insurance law.74 State Farm's more narrow and "pa­
rochial" financial interest could not be subsumed into the shared 
interests of all the citizens, and representation of both was a poten­
tial conflict of interest enough to satisfy the minimal burden be­
cause it would require different legal arguments.75 The same 
"impossible task"76 of representing both public and private finan­
cial interests exists, but the reasoning extends to show the general 
conflict through the resulting legal arguments in order to overcome 
the minimal burden. 
In Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Mos­
bacher,77 the First Circuit analyzed the issue when a public interest 
organization brought a suit against the Secretary of Commerce to 
protect certain fish from stock depletion through over-fishing.78 
Regulated commercial fishing groups were seeking to intervene 
since the agreement would introduce more stringent rules for the 
amount and type of catchesJ9 The court found that the Secretary's 
representation must be driven by his or her view of public welfare, 
70. 792 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
71. [d. at 183. 
72. [d. at 192. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. at 193. 
75. [d.; see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 912 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (overcoming minimal burden when parties have different scopes to their interests 
such that their interests "may not coincide" because the intervenor has a more eco­
nomic interest than the government). 
76. See Dimond, 792 F.2d at 193 ("Thus, the District government would face a 
potential conflict of interest were it to represent both the general interests of its citizens 
and the financial interests of State Farm.") (citing Nat'l Farm Lines v. Interstate Com­
merce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1977) ("impossible task"». 
77. 966 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992). 
78. Id. at 44. 
79. Id. 
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which may stand in opposition to the personal, economic interests 
of the commercial fishermen.8o 
The court noted that the Secretary's acceptance of the entire 
relief sought without filing an answer to the complaint indicated 
that the narrower interest of the intervenors was not being ade­
quately represented.81 Regulatory agencies and regulated indus­
tries can have different scopes of interest in a settlement 
agreement, even if they agree that the regulations should be law­
fu1. 82 The court reiterated the "impossible task" conflict when an 
agency is seeking to protect both public interest and the private in­
terest of the intervenor.83 Consequently, the Secretary was unlikely 
to, and perhaps never could, represent the fishing groups' interests 
adequately.84 Stated summarily, the parties have interests differing 
in scope, and because the government may find itself in a conflict of 
interest, the minimal burden is satisfied. 
b. 	 Second Stage: Minimal Burden to Rebut Adequate 
Representation 
Subsequent cases have eroded the standard established in 
Trbovich that the representation only "may be" inadequate by 
presuming that existing representation by government parties was 
adequate. An example presuming government representation to be 
adequate occurred in Forest Conservation Council v. United States 
Forest Service.85 
80. Id. The example given by the Court of the fisherman's interest was paying off 
the mortgage on a boat requiring maximum catches even if the long-term effect was to 
deplete permanently the whole fishing stock. Id. 
81. Id.; see Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S.G. Phillips Corp., 610 F.2d 49, 54-55 
(1st Cir. 1979) (indicating that if intervenors presented evidence of the government 
party "sleeping on their oars," it could be sufficient to show inadequacy); Sanguine, 
Ltd. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that 
failure to file responsive pleading or brief, call any witnesses, or make any arguments 
against plaintiff's motion was sufficient to show the minimal burden for inadequate 
representation). 
82. Conservation Law Found., 966 F.2d at 44 (citing the reasoning in Natural Res. 
Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1977». 
83. Id. at 44-45 (referencing the conflict between private and public interests 
from Nat'l Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 
1977». 
84. Id.; see Nat'l Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 384 
(10th Cir. 1977) (undertaking a "task which is on its face impossible" when an agency 
tries to protect both the public interest and interest of private intervenor); see also New 
York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 516 F.2d 350, 351-52 
(2d Cir. 1975). 
85. 66 F.3d 1489, 1498-99 (9th Cir. 1995) (using the wording "may be" inadequate 
but employing a presumption in favor of the government). 
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In Forest Conservation Council, the Ninth Circuit used a pre­
sumption of adequate representation when the existing party was a 
government body charged with representing the intervenors' inter­
ests and required a minimum showing to overcome the pre sump­
tion.86 The Forest Conservation Council, in order to force 
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act and the 
National Forest Management Act, sought an injunction prohibiting 
the sale of timber from a wildlife habitat.87 The State of Arizona 
tried to intervene, in part because it received money from timber 
sales in the national forests.88 
The court in Forest Conservation Council, within the context of 
presuming adequate representation, considered whether the gov­
ernment would "undoubtedly make all the intervenor's arguments; 
whether [it] is capable and willing to make such arguments; and 
whether the intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the 
proceedings that other parties would neglect."89 The United States 
Forest Service was charged with representing the broad public in­
terest, not just Arizona's "narrow, parochial interests."9o In fact, 
the Forest Service was not charged with a duty to represent Ari­
zona's asserted interests because its view was necessarily broader.91 
The difference in scope of interests satisfied the minimal showing to 
overcome the presumption of adequate representation.92 While the 
standard included a presumption favoring government representa­
tion, the general difference in scope between public and private in" 
terests was enough to overcome the minimal showing and Arizona 
was able to intervene~93 
86. [d. at 1499 (citing Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976); see 
also WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 324. 
87. Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499. 
88. [d. at 1492. 
89. [d. at 1498-99. The court also rejected the claim that amicus curiae status is 
sufficient to protect the intervenor's interests by allowing them to express their argu­
ments, because it would not give them legal means to challenge the injunction on their 
own behalf. [d. at 1498. 
90. [d.; see Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1208 (5th Cir. 1994) (economic 
concerns); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1000-01 
(8th Cir. 1993) (narrower local interests); Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 
F.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1992) (personal interest not subsumed into public); Natural Res. 
Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (personal not public interest); 
see also 3B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcrICE 'll 24.07[4] (2d 
ed. 1995) ("Inadequate representation is most likely to be found when the applicant 
asserts a personal interest that does not belong to the general public."). 
91. Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
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The court in Mausolf v. Babbitt94 more fully defined and ex­
panded the presumption for government representation. The 
Eighth Circuit acknowledged that a minimal showing easily satis­
fied Rule 24(a)(2)'s last criterion except when the party was a gov­
ernment entity and the matter was one of sovereign interest.95 In 
that circumstance, the court presumed that the government ade­
quately represented the interests of all its citizens.96 The presump­
tion hinges on whether the government is acting as parens patriae.97 
Underlying the rationale for a presumption of adequate repre­
sentation is the role of the government as parens patriae,98 the 
"trustee, guardian, or representative of all her citizens. "99 The 
courts later expanded this concept to cover cases in which the 
governmental entity represented "quasi-sovereign"100 interests 
because they assumed that the government deserved special 
consideration.101 
Under the parens patriae concept, the courts presumed ade­
quate representation by the government of the citizens' interests in 
any suit involving a matter of sovereign interest.102 To overcome 
the presumption of adequacy, the intervenor had to provide more 
than a minimal showing; instead, it had to demonstrate that the in­
terest was in fact different and unrepresented.103 "[T]he govern­
94. 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996). 
95. Id. at 1303. 
96. Id. 
97. Id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 769 (6th ed. abr. 1991) ("It is the principle 
that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves .... [A] concept 
of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort 
and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc."). 
98. See United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 261 (1911) ("The rule ... has 
been applied frequently in the different states, and practically in the Federal courts .... 
[S]o much of the royal prerogatives as belonged to the King in his capacity of parens 
patriae, or universal trustee, enters as much into our political state as it does into the 
principles of the British Constitution."). 
99. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984 (2d Cir. 
1984) (citations omitted). The government had brought suit against chemical and plas­
tics corporations about a landfill in violation of the Clean Water Act and environmental 
groups were trying to intervene. Id. at 972-73. The court found that if a government 
entity was representing the interests in its parens patriae capacity, the intervenor had to 
demonstrate a compelling, not properly represented interest distinguishable from its 
interest in the class of all citizens of the state. Id. at 984 (citations omitted). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 985. 
103. Id. The court chose not to adopt a "presumption" of adequate representa­
tion by the sovereign in a parens patriae capacity, despite its references to such a pre­
sumption in other cases, but it did determine that a greater showing of inadequacy was 
required. The instant applicants for intervention did not show any conflicting roles, like 
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ment's exclusive control over the course of its litigation" would not 
be improperly disrupted if a higher standard for showing inade­
quate representation was used.104 
Mausolf involved snowmobilers who, trying to enjoin restric­
tions on snowmobiling in a national park, brought a suit against the 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior. lOs Conservation 
groups were seeking to intervene to protect the wildlife environ­
ment in the park and prevent injury to their members through the 
snowmobiles' environmental destruction.106 The government was 
responsible for protecting the conservation concerns as parens pa­
triae, so the higher standard applied.107 However, the intervenors 
had to rebut the presumption with a "strong showing" that the in­
tervenors' interests were not subsumed within the general public 
interest.1°8 The presumption does not derive from Trbovich, indeed 
Mausolf does not mention Trbovich at all.109 
To rebut the presumption, the conservation groups showed 
that of the Secretary in Trbovich, and the "mere existence of disagreement over some 
aspects" of the resolution does not prove that the government, as parens patriae, was 
inadequately representing the parties. Id. at 987. The court also stated that it would be 
going too far to require a showing of collusion, a standard that develops later, and 
settled on a "strong affirmative showing that the sovereign is not fairly representing the 
interests of the applicant." Id. at 985. 
104. Id. at 987. 
105. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1296. 
106. Id. Alleged injuries to the members were based on the fact that several 
members planned to visit the park on a consistent basis and they would have been 
injured directly if the snowmobilers' activities in the park were left unrestricted. Id. at 
1301. 
107. Id. at 1303. The instant case is distinguished from Mille Lacs Band of Chip­
pewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 1993), an earlier Eighth Circuit 
decision, where the court determined that the state was only protecting the counties' 
interests if those interests were subsumed into the general public interests the govern­
ment had to protect, otherwise the state was not acting in its sovereign capacity. In a 
departure from past precedent, the court decided that they were narrower interests and 
not subsumed, so the parens patriae doctrine did not apply. 
108. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303 (citing United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 
1152, 1169 (8th Cir. 1995»; Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1000. Mille Lacs derived the pre­
sumption rule from a previous case about racial discrimination in hiring practices. Penn­
sylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 502 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[A] presumption of adequate 
representation generally arises when the representative is a governmental body or of­
ficer charged by law with representing the interests of the absentee.") (citing 7 A 
CHARLES WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACflCE AND PROCEDURE § 1909,528-29 
(1972»; see Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961) (dictum) 
("[S]ound policy would strongly lead us to decline appellants' invitation to assess the 
wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and accepting the 1960 consent 
decree ... in the absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the 
Government ...."). 
109. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1295. 
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that the government must represent all of its citizens and the park 
was designed to benefit those citizens differently.11o To avoid the 
"tragedy of the commons" for public lands,111 the government had 
to favor certain uses over others.112 The recreational and conserva­
tionist uses would inevitably conflict, and the government could not 
adequately represent conflicting interests at the same time.113 
The recreational uses of the public and the conservationist uses 
may be adverse to one another even though both fall within the 
government's protection.114 The conflict in interests would pre­
clude the government from adequately representing the intervenors 
because, "when the proposed intervenors' concern is not a matter 
of 'sovereign interest,' there is no reason to think the government 
will represent it."115 The standard for adequate representation be­
came more restricted, no longer the minimal burden.of Trbovich, to 
include a presumption under the parens patriae doctrine if the gov­
ernment was acting in its sovereign capacity.116 A strong showing 
can overcome the higher standard, such as when the intervenor's 
interest could not be subsumed into the general interest.117 
The Third Circuit used the higher standard to presume ade­
quate government representation in Kleissler v. United States Forest 
Service.11s State residents and an environmental organization 
brought suit against the Forest Service for violating statutory re­
quirements when it permitted substantial logging in the Allegheny 
110. Id. at 1303. 
111. The "tragedy of the commons" is an economic concept in which the govern­
ment must put some uses, those benefiting tIfe public welfare, above others to protect 
"the commons." See id. The tragedy occurs when the public overuses public resources 
because individuals are not paying the full cost of the consumption. G.S. Rasmussen & 
Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1992). The government 
has to step in, using its sovereign powers, to protect common resources. But the govern­
ment's interest in protecting these resources from overuse or depletion may not coin­
cide with the intervenor's interest; indeed, they may be in conflict. See Sierra Club v. 
Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (representing the public inter­
est does not necessarily include the intervenor's narrower interest); Conservation Law 
Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1992) (representing the public interest 
may prevent the government from also advancing the narrower interest of a private 
entity); see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968) (introducing the economic theory and coining the phrase). 
112. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. 157 F.3d 964, 967 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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National Forest.119 Logging companies tried to join in the interven­
tion motion that area school districts with financial interests in the 
logging industry filed.12° The Third Circuit noted that it supported 
the more flexible interpretation of Rule 24, rather than the histori­
cally rigid interpretation,121 but merely having an economic interest 
was not decisive enough to allow intervention automatically.122 
The court used a more complicated standard. A government 
entity charged by law with maintaining a national policy is pre­
sumed able to represent an intervenor adequately, particularly 
when the interests of the intervenor "closely parallel those of the 
public agency."123 The burden to overcome the presumption re­
quires a strong showing of inadequate representation.124 However, 
when the agency's views, centered on the public welfare, differ from 
the personal parochial views of the intervenor, the burden is 
lighter.125 Indeed, the burden supposedly varies according to the 
facts of the case.126 
Kleissler defined the "polestar for evaluating a claim for inter­
vention is always whether the proposed intervenor's interest is di­
rect or remote."127 To maintain efficient litigation' while retaining 
flexibility for Rule 24, the intervenor should have a specific defined 
interest that the relief sought would directly affect.128 While the 
intervenor's economic interest would not change, the government 
policy could, and the economic interest could become lost in gov­
ernment policy.129 In Kleissler, the private party intervenors had a 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 968. 
121. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 
133-34 (1967); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994) (allowing two 
timber companies to intervene but only where their interests were sufficient to satisfy 
Rule 24(a) because they had existing timber contracts). 
122. Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 970. 
123. [d. at 972 (citing Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1123 (3d Cir. 1992». 
124. [d. (deriving the "strong showing" language from Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 
1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996». 
125. [d.; see Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 
1992) (ruling that intervention is allowed because the governmental entity's judgment is 
"necessarily constrained by his view of the public welfare" and the intervenors may 
"see their own interest in a different, perhaps more parochial light"); Mausolf, 85 F.3d 
at 1303 (stating when not to apply parens patriae presumption because "when a pro­
posed intervenors' concern is not a matter of 'sovereign interest,' there is no reason to 
think the government will represent it"). 
126. Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972. 
127. !d. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. at 973-74. 
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direct, rather than remote, interest that the government did not 
adequately represent; therefore, the court allowed intervention.l3° 
Kleissler is a pivotal .case because it shows how the presumption 
depends on the nature of the interests, how the burden changes de­
pending on the interests, and orients its ruling on whether the inter­
ests are direct or remote. 
c. 	 Third Stage: Requiring that the Intervenor Show Inadequate 
Representation 
The courts, using the presumption developed in the preceding 
cases, continued to define the burden an intervenor must satisfy to 
overcome the presumption. Raising the bar ever higher against in­
tervention, this standard required an actual conflict or tangible ba­
sis for a difference in interest, not just a theoretical one. 
The First Circuit defined adequate representation in two sec­
tions in Daggett v. Commission on Government Ethics and Election 
Practices .131 First, adequate representation is presumed if the ap­
plicant's and existing party's goals are the same.l32 Second, the rep­
resentation is presumed to be adequate when it is the government 
defending the validity of a statute.133 
In Daggett, current office holders and prospective candidates 
sought to intervene in a suit brought by other candidates against the 
Commission to challenge the Maine Clean Election Act. 134 They 
tried to overcome the burden in two ways, showing an actual con­
flict of interest and showing the use of different legal arguments.135 
130. Id. 
131. 172 F.3d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 1999). Directly before this decision, the First Cir­
cuit decided Pub. Servo CO. V. Patch, 136 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 1998), where the court as­
serted that the criterion for adequate representation "is more than a paper tiger." Id. at 
207. While the interests of the intervenor were defined as narrower and economic, the 
court stated that the burden of persuasion for the claim is increased because the repre­
sentative party is a governmental entity, acting in a governmental capacity, so there is a 
presumption of adequacy requiring a "strong affirmative showing" to rebut. Id. (cita­
tions omitted). 
The court decided that the representation was adequate because the intervenors 
failed to show a legal argument that was antipathetic to the intervenors' goals. Id. at 
208. The intervenors attempted to have the court infer the possibility of an adverse 
defense because of the implied difference in interest, but the court declined to do so. Id. 
The court wanted a strong showing of actual, contradictory, legal arguments that would 
make the ultimate objectives conflict. Id. 
132. Daggett, 172 F.3d at 111. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 108. 
135. ld. at 112. 
149 2002] PRESUMED REPRESENTED 
Actions that the representing party has taken136 or can be reasona­
bly predicted to take137 can show actual conflict of interest resulting 
in inadequate representation. Abstractly representing a "broader" 
interest does not rebut the presumption.138 However, if the Attor­
ney General decided not to appeal, the court could re-examine in­
tervention as of right on the grounds of conflict of interest.B9 
Although not an actual conflict of interest, the legal arguments 
may differ despite having the same ultimate goal of defending the 
Act.140 The court found that differing arguments do not create in­
adequate representation per se, but could become extreme enough, 
such as a refusal to present obvious arguments, to warrant finding 
inadequate representation even if no actual conflict of interests ex­
isted.l41 Despite the fact that the Attorney General had submitted 
a memorandum identifying differences in approach between the 
parties and supporting the intervention, the intervenors failed to 
show that the Attorney General had refused to present their argu­
ments and that an amicus brief was insufficient.142 
The court established a standard allowing either actual conflict 
of interest or extremely divergent legal arguments to overcome the 
presumption of adequate representation if proven with strong evi­
dence.143 Otherwise, the intervenors can use amicus briefs or, ac­
cording to the court, take up the issue again upon the existing 
parties' failure to appeal.l44 
The First Circuit again ruled on intervention as of right soon 
afterward and, since the court read "interest" under Rule 24(a)(2) 
136. [d. (referencing Mosbacher where the representing party had already acqui­
esced to the consent decree the intervenor was trying to fight); see Conservation Law 
Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1992). 
137. [d.; see also Dimond v. Dist. of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
138. Daggett, 172 F.3d at 112; see Pub. Servo CO. V. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 207-08 
(1st Cir. 1998). 
139. Daggett, 172 F.3d at 112; cf Meek V. Metro. Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 
1478 (11th Cir. 1993). 
140. Daggett, 172 F.3d at 112. 
141. [d.; see Stadin V. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 1962); cf Grut­
ter V. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) ("It may be enough to show that the 
existing party who purports to seek the same outcome will not make all of the prospec­
tive intervenor's arguments.") (citations omitted). 
142. Daggett, 172 F.3d at 112. 
143. [d. 
144. [d.; cf Meek, 985 F.2d at 1478 n.2 ("We do not now hold that one who has an 
interest in ongoing litigation in which a public body is adequately representing that 
interest may simply wait until judgment is entered and intervene on appeal simply be­
cause the public body decides not to appeal ...."). 
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more broadly, interpreted the adequacy of representation as a more 
restricted standard.145 In Massachusetts Food Association v. Massa­
c;:husetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission,146 supermarket 
chains brought an action under the Sherman Act 147 against the 
Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission to stop 
enforcement of a Massachusetts statute limiting the number of re­
tail liquor stores a single entity could own.148 Trade associations, 
representing retail liquor stores, sought to intervene.149 
While applying the presumption that the government defen­
dant adequately represented the interests of the private parties, the 
court rejected outright the argument that, whenever the govern­
ment is the regulator of the party seeking to intervene, the court 
should apply a per se rule that the government's representation is 
inadequate.15o The court also dispensed with the theory that the 
intervenor's different legal arguments could satisfy the burden of 
showing inadequate representation.151 
Instead, the court stated that intervenors could present these 
arguments in amicus curiae briefs.152 The court did note that ami­
cus briefs would not be adequate when the intervenors have infor­
mation that could only be included if they are participating as 
parties.153 Amicus briefs could also advise the Supreme Court of 
missing arguments in the event the Commonwealth won and th.e 
Massachusetts Food Association sought certiorari.154 The standard 
has evolved to the point where there is a presumption in favor of 
existing government parties, a showing is necessary to overcome the 
presumption, and other legal arguments are not enough to satisfy 
the burden because those can be presented as amicus. 
The standard for intervention consists of a burden that the in­
tervenor must prove unless the party was a governmental entity acl­
145. Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 197 F.3d 
560,566-67 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating "[b]ut perhaps as a counterweight to the broad read­
ing of 'interest,' the courts have been quite ready to presume [adequate representation] 
unless there is a showing to the contrary"). 
146. /d. 
147. 15 U.S.c. § 1 (2000) (restraint of illegal trade). 
148. Mass. Food Ass'n, 197 F.3d at 562-63. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 567. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. (citing Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics and Election Practices, 172 
F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999». 
154. Id. at 568. 
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ing in a sovereign capacity.155 If so, the court applies a presumption 
of adequate representation and the intervenor has to make a 
stronger showing of inadequate representation.156 An intervenor 
could rebut the presumption by showing that the overall interests 
represented by the Government contained conflicting interests, in­
cluding the narrower one of the intervenor that was not subsumed 
in the general public interest. 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The current circuit split arose from the development of differ­
ent burdens after the 1966 amendments to Rule 24 and the Su­
preme Court decision in Trbovich 157 in 1972. There are two forces 
at work here. The first is that the government is a sovereign power 
over its people and able to represent them in matters of public con­
cern. The second is that some individual concerns within the spec­
trum of the public welfare are specific to the individual, or even 
adverse to the general interest, and not subsumed within the public 
nature of the government representation. 
The dichotomy between the two forces is most clear when the 
suit involves the government as a regulator, trying to uphold a stat­
ute regulating some aspect of public welfare, and the intervenor is a 
business entity regulated by the statute yet with distinct economic 
concerns that could easily differ from the public intent of the stat­
ute. The circuit split developed in a general sense because the 
courts were focusing on one of the forces as more crucial than the 
other. Either the government as sovereign was most important, or 
the individual entity had a separate concern and the government 
could not possibly represent them both adequately, in other words, 
per se inadequate representation. 
A. Per Se Inadequate Representation 
Rule 24(a)(2) allows intervention as of right when an inter­
venor meets the first two criteria,158 unless existing parties already 
155. See, e.g., Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv.; 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The 
burden of establishing inadequacy of representation by existing parties varies with each 
case .... A strong showing of inadequate representation [is necessary to overcome the 
presumption]. "). 
156. See, e.g., Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alcoholic Bev. Control Comm'n, 197 
F.3d 560, 567 (1st Cir. 1999) (using a standard of "showing" but finding that other legal 
arguments and direct economic effect were not enough of a showing). 
157. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
158. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2). 
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adequately represent the intervenor,159 The burden to show inade­
quate representation is minimal, as defined by the Supreme Court 
in Trbovich,160 When the existing party is a government entity that 
regulates the proposed intervenor, some circuits allow the interven­
tion virtually per se because it is impossible for the government to 
represent adequately the specific interests of those it regulates as it 
represents the general public interest. 
Specifically addressing the circumstance where regulating enti­
ties had inherently different interests than the parties they regu­
lated, the Sixth Circuit decided that representation was inadequate 
in Linton v. Commissioner of Health and Environment.161 In Lin­
ton, nursing homes tried to intervene in a suit filed against the Ten­
nessee Commissioner of Health and Environment.162 The Sixth 
Circuit decided that, because the Tennessee Department of Health 
and Environment acted as both regulator and purchaser of the in­
tervenor's services, "inherent inconsistencies" were created be­
tween the intervenor's interests and those of the State, thereby 
resulting in inadequate representation,163 In its brief discussion of 
this facet of intervention, the court did not derive its ruling from 
other decisions involving inadequate representation.164 Rather, it 
viewed the situation as so inherently conflicting that there was no 
need to further define the interests.165 
In Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman,166 the Sixth Circuit reasserted its 
position that no higher standard for adequate representation exists 
for government entities who are parties to the suit.167 Lakeshore 
property owners had challenged the Forest Service's authority to 
regulate the wilderness area surrounding Crooked Lake in Michi­
gan, which included specifically banning the use of boats,168 Envi­
ronmental groups and other lakeshore owners sought to 
intervene.169 The district court applied the parens patriae doctrine 
and raised the bar on intervention through the presumption of ade­
159. See supra Part I. 
160. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.lO (1972); see supra 
notes 28-36 and accompanying text. 
161. 973 F.2d 1311, 1319-20 (6th Cir. 1992). 
162. Id. at 1313. 
163. ld. 
164. Id. at 1319-20 (citing only to Trbovich). 
165. ld. 
166. 226 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 20(0). 
167. ld. at 479. 
168. ld. at 469-70. 
169. ld. at 470-71. 
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quate representation by a government entity acting in a sovereign 
capacity.17° 
The Sixth Circuit had just rejected this doctrine,171 but the dis­
trict court had already entered final judgment in the instant case.172 
The court of appeals concluded that the intervention was not timely 
and did not allow intervention.173 The court, however, reasserted 
that it would not apply the parens patriae doctrine.174 
The dissent in Stupak- Thrall disagreed with the majority's in­
terpretation of the district court opinion on whether timeliness was 
the deciding factor.175 Instead, the dissent found that the decision 
rested on the district court's erroneous use of the parens patriae 
doctrine in determining whether adequate representation ex­
isted.176 In the absence of the parens patriae doctrine, the interven­
tion should be allowed under a lenient standard,177 as established in 
Trbovich. Indeed, the intervenor is the best judge of whether the 
governmental entities can adequately represent its interests, and 
any uncertainty regarding the inadequacy of the representation 
should be resolved in favor of the intervenor.178 
While both parties shared the same ultimate goal of preserving 
the wilderness, the interests of the government and the Wilderness 
Association were likely to diverge, particularly since the Wilderness 
Association had advocated stricter restrictions than the govern­
ment.179 The actual conflict revolved around whether the govern­
ment had the right to include Crooked Lake within the designated 
wilderness area and, in this matter, the interests were largely identi­
cal.180 Wilderness Association argued that its interests could di­
verge later, however, if the parties entered into settlement 
negotiations.181 Without using a· presumption in the government's 
170. [d. at 479 {citing Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996) to 
define the parens patriae doctrine that the Sixth Circuit declined to follow). 
171. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394,400 (6th Cir. 1999) ("However, this circuit 
has declined to endorse a higher standard for inadequacy when a governmental entity is 
involved."). 
172. Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d at 479. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. at 480 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
176. [d. at 482 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
177. [d. (Moore, J., dissenting). 
178. [d. (Moore, J., dissenting); see also 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.03[4][a] (3d ed. 2000). 
179. Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d at 482 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 482 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
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favor, the dissent would have granted intervention because the in­
terests, while identical now, had a real possibility of diverging at 
some point in the future over settlement issues, and that was 
enough to satisfy the minimal standard.182 
The Tenth Circuit recently addressed the difference between 
the government and the intervenor having the same ultimate objec­
tives as opposed to having the same interests.183 Counties in Utah 
had filed suit to prevent the creation of a national monument, de­
creed by President Clinton, that would prevent a proposed under­
ground coal mine at the site. l84 Environmental groups were 
seeking to intervene to protect the public lands and environment.185 
The Tenth Circuit had used a liberal standard for intervention as of 
right since National Farm Lines186 whereby the minimal showing is 
easily met when the existing party was the government.187 Even if 
the objectives were identical, if the intervenor had expertise that 
the government did not have, or had a private interest whereas the 
government must represent the public interest, the government's 
representation would not be adequate.188 
Although a presumption against intervention was used when 
the objectives were the same,189 the court found that the presump­
tion was rebutted if the public interest represented by the govern­
ment could differ from the private one asserted by the 
intervenor.190 The court clarified the distinction that the objectives, 
182. Id.(Moore, J., dissenting). 
183. Utah Ass'nof Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001). 
184. Id. at 1248. 
185. Id. at 1249. 
186. Id.; Nat'l Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 384 
(10th Cir. 1977). Previously, the Tenth Circuit used a minimal burden that could be 
overcome by showing either collusion between the government and opposing party, 
that the government had an adverse interest, or that the government was actually failing 
to fulfill its duty to represent the intervenor's interest. But a presumption of adequacy 
was appropriate when the objectives were identical. However, the objectives were not 
identical if the interests were public and private because to represent both was an im­
possible task. Coalition of Ariz.IN.M. Counties v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844-45 
(10th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat'l Farm Lines, 564 F.2d at 384). 
187. Utah Ass'n, 255 F.3d at 1254-55. 
188. [d. at 1255. 
189. Id.; see Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
190. Utah Ass'n, 255 F.3d at 1255 (citing Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 
(8th Cir. 1996) (managing public lands means that the government must favor some 
interests to avoid the "tragedy of the commons"); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 
110 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (showing inadequate representation even if objective 
was the same because the public interest would not necessarily coincide with the private 
interest); Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1992) 
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or posture in litigation, were not the same thing as the interests.191 
Hence, while the government and the intervenor could share objec­
tives, the distinct interests asserted, whether private or public, could 
create a potential conflict that rendered the representation 
inadequate. 
B. Presumption of Adequate Representation 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Trbovich,192 some circuits 
have moved to increase the obstacles to intervention, particularly in 
cases where a governmental entity is the party already representing 
the interests.193 In part, the development occurred to maintain ju­
dicial economy and simplicity.194 These courts have been reluctant 
to treat less concrete differences in interests as legitimate. Al­
though all of the cases derive from Rule 24(a)(2), which does not 
specify a higher standard, some circuits have raised the bar to pre­
sume adequate representation, particularly if the government party 
is charged with representing the interests of the intervenor as a 
member of the public or as a regulated industry. 
A district court in the Third Circuit recently addressed the is­
sue and illuminated the distinction in the presumption of adequate 
representation when the interests are not identical.195 Cloverland­
Green Spring Dairies brought suit against the Pennsylvania Milk 
Marketing Board challenging the Milk Marketing Law and the min­
imum wholesale milk prices set by the board, which they claimed 
made it impossible for them to sell milk in Pennsylvania.196 Since 
the minimum prices set by the Board affected their profits, the 
Pennsylvania Association of Milk Dealers filed to intervene.197 The 
Board was interested in defending the constitutionality of the law; a 
government party is presumed to provide adequate representation 
when it is charged by law to uphold a national policy.198 However, 
(representing the intervenor's private interests violates the government's duty to re­
present the public); In re Sierra Club, 945 F.2d 776, 779-80 (4th CiT. 1991) (representing 
public interest conflicts with private interests even if objectives are the same). 
191. Utah Ass'n, 255 F.3d at 1255-56. 
192. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 129-154 and accompanying text. 
194. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 377-78 (indicating that impact on "fair and effi­
cient administration of justice" is an important factor to consider when allowing 
intervention). 
195. Clover land-Green Spring Dairies v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 2d 593, 
601 (M.D. Pa. 20Gl). 
196. Id. at 598. 
197. Id. at 601. 
198. Id. (citing Kleiss1er v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d CiT. 1998)). 
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"this presumption is not as substantial when the ... interests are not 
identical. "199 
Because the intervenor's and the government's interests over­
lapped, the court found that a presumption existed for adequate 
representation by the government.2OO The intervenor had an eco­
nomic interest in having the law upheld, while the government had 
a public interest.201 Yet, both would vigorously argue for the con­
tinued viability of the law, so the presumption not only applied but 
was also proven true in the course of the litigation.202 Although the 
applicable standard was not annunciated, the court denied interven­
tion as of right since the intervenor failed to demonstrate inade­
quate representation and, therefore, failed to meet the burden to 
rebut the presumption.203 
The First Circuit discussed at length the circumstances in which 
the presumption occurs and the circuit's history of cases dealing 
with it.204 In an environmental dispute, the State of Maine and bus­
iness groups sued the National Marine Fisheries Service regarding a 
decision designating atlantic salmon in certain areas of Maine as an 
endangered species.205 Several conservation groups tried to inter­
vene on the side of the United States to defend the designation.206 
In earlier litigation, the conservation groups had brought suit 
against the service to force protection of the salmon; they now ar­
gued that the United States could not adequately represent their 
interests.207 
The court stated that "some burden" is placed on the interven­
ors to show inadequacy and that there was a "general alignment of 
interests. "208 The court distinguished the instant case from Trbo­
vich because there were not "two distinct interests" between indi­
viduals and the general public that the same government entity was 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. (citing neither the standard in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 
U.S. 528 (1972) nor any others for what the strength of the burden was). 
204. Maine v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 262 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2001). 
205. Id. at 14. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 17-18 (citing Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics & Election Practices, 
172 F.3d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 1999) without indicating whether the burden was of produc­
tion or of persuasion). 
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trying to represent.209 Several decisions in the First Circuit fol­
lowed the same paradigm: "a group with recognized interests 
wishes to intervene and defend an action of the government which 
the government is itself defending."21o 
The court's holding was based upon the following analysis. 
The government is presumed to provide adequate representation if 
its interest is aligned with the intervenor's.211 However, "presump­
tion" is not intended to do more than require an explanation of why 
the assumed adequate representation is less than adequate, in view 
of the overalllitigation.212 Specifically, a mere difference in tactics 
does not rebut the presumption.213 The court found a distinction, 
however, between the instant case and other cases within the circuit 
that had allowed intervention.214 In those cases, the intervenors 
had direct private interests that the government had no interest in 
protecting.215 While the parties in the instant case stated similar 
interests, and merely evidenced a tactical disagreement, the test for 
inadequacy could be differentiated depending on the nature of the 
interests.216 As in Massachusetts Food Association v. Massachusetts 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission,217 the court considered 
the intervenors' specific arguments, in lieu of intervention, to be 
represented through its "amicus-plus" status.218 
Immediately thereafter, a district court in Massachusetts ap­
plied Maine v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service to an inter­
vention motion.219 The Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance, 
209. Id. at 19 (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538-39 
(1972». 
210. Id.; see Cotter v. Mass. Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, 219 
F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000) (seeking to intervene to defend promotions of minority officers); 
Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 197 F.3d 560 (1st Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1105 (2000); Daggett, 172 F.3d at 104; Public Servo CO. V. 
Patch, 136 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 1998). 
211. Maine, 262 F.3d at 19. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 20. 
215. Id. (citing Cotter, 219 F.3d at 34 (promotion of minority police officers); 
Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992) (commercial 
fishermen». 
216. Id. 
217. 197 F.3d 560, 568 (1st Cir. 1999). 
218. Maine, 262 F.3d at 19. "Amicus-plus" status, as defined by the district court, 
gave the proposed intervenors the right to submit briefs for arguments not submitted by 
the government, a limited right to call and cross-examine witnesses, and to receive no­
tice of documents as if they were parties. Id. at 14. 
219. Ruthardt V. United States, 164 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D. Mass. 2001). 
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as receiver of two insolvent insurance companies, sought a declara­
tory judgment regarding priority of claims under a Massachusetts 
statute.220 Insurance guaranty funds moved to intervene to protect 
their priority status over claims of the United States during liquida­
tion of the insurance companies.221 The funds were seeking essen­
tially the same declaration as the government party.222 
-' The district court held that under the First Circuit's standard, 
the four elements of Rule 24(a)(2) are "read not discretely, but to­
gether, and always in keeping with a commonsense view of the 
overalllitigation."223 Although the showing is only minimal, it must 
include a "tangible basis" supporting the inadequacy of representa­
tion.224 The court did not use the presumption wording, but rather 
"ratchet[ed] up" the burden of persuasion when the government 
was currently acting to defend a public act and the private party 
also attempted to intervene in defense.225 
The First Circuit identified some factors that could call into 
question the adequacy of the governmental defense, particularly re­
garding the introduction of private interests in a regulatory con­
text.226 The funds were not engaged in a previously adversarial 
relationship with the government defendant, and the interests of 
both did not presently diverge to a significant degree.227 Despite 
noting that the government has a "less personal economic interest," 
the court reasoned that the government had a well-developed de­
fense and was "ready, willing, and able to vigorously defend" the 
statute.228 The intervenors had not shown that there was an argu­
ment or evidence that was excluded without them as parties, and 
they were included as amici; therefore, intervention was 
unnecessary.229 
The court used a higher burden of persuasion, rather than a 
presumption of adequate representation, when the government was 
the existing party and the interests aligned themselves. Although 
referring to the burden in Trbovich, the court also cited the pre­
sumption from Public Service Company of New Hampshire v. 
220. Id. at 234. 
221. Id. at 234-36. 
222. Id. at 245. 
223. Id. at 245 (citing Pub. Servo Co. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
224. Id. at 246. 
225. Id. (citing Maine, 262 F.3d at 18-20). 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 247. 
229. Id. 
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Patch, demonstrating the divergent sources of the contradictory 
standards.230 Under this higher standard, a mere difference of tac­
tics, or the general difference between economic concerns and pub­
lic concerns is not enough to satisfy the intervenor's burden. 
When deciding whether Rule 24(a)(2) would allow interven­
tion as of right, the courts have produced a spectrum of standards 
based on a variety of analytical frameworks. Due to the inconsis­
tency created through application of this spectrum of standards, the 
courts could benefit from a more uniform standard that incorpo­
rates the Rule, the legal history, and the interests of the court, the 
parties, and the intervenor. This Note turns next to such an 
integration. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The different relationships that can exist between the govern­
ment and the intervenor have fostered an array of tests for ade­
quate representation when the government is already a party. Is 
the problem whether the existing party is a government entity regu­
lating the intervenor and, therefore, responsible for its interests? Is 
it whether the interests themselves differ sufficiently to require that 
the intervenor represent its own interests? Or is it that these two 
conditions cannot coexist, as when the existing party is a govern­
mental entity regulating the intervenor, and it cannot per se ade­
quately represent the intervenor's interests? 
Upon examination of the courts' focuses and assumptions, an 
analytical framework emerges that incorporates the difference, or 
implied difference, in interests as well as fidelity to Rule 24(a)(2). 
The framework does not include a presumption that applies when­
ever the existing party is governmental. Instead, it is based on de­
fining the interests, determining whether differences, if any, exist, 
and deciding how those differences affect the standard the court 
should use in determining whether the representation is adequate. 
To get to the analytical framework, the courts must return to Rule 
24(a)(2) as written and, by doing so, protect the three main pur­
poses behind the Rule: protecting interests of non-parties, further­
ing the court's truthseeking function, and maintaining judicial 
economy. Then, the courts should abandon the parens patriae pre­
sumption as it obscures the final step of applying the analytical 
framework to define and compare the interests of the parties in or­
230. [d. at 246. 
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der to apply the correct standard for judging adequate 
representation. 
A. Returning to Rule 24(a)(2) As Written 
As a result of its creation, amendments, and interpretation, 
Rule 24(a)(2) serves three primary functions that should be incor­
porated into the framework of intervention analysis.231 The first 
function is to protect the interests of non-parties.232 Under the first 
two sections of the rule, an intervenor must show that it has an 
interest that could be impaired by the resolution of the suit.233 
To arrive at whether representation is adequate, the intervenor 
has already demonstrated a need to be a party to the action. If the 
existing governmental party is adequately protecting the demon­
strated interests of the intervenor, then the first function is fulfilled. 
This protective function encompasses more than just a shared inter­
est. If the intervenor has interests that are subsidiary to the pri­
mary issue before the court, yet the disposition will affect them, the 
interests must still be protected.234 
The second function of Rule 24(a)(2) is to further the court's 
truthseeking.235 The court should try all the legal and factual issues 
in the suit. If an interest is presented that fulfills the first two re­
quirements of Rule 24, and is not subsumed into interests already 
represented, it should be represented.236 
Finally, the third essential function of Rule 24(a)(2) is judicial 
economy.237 All issues that are part of an action should be disposed 
of in a single suit. Even if the intervenor is expanding the scope of 
litigation in a particular suit, judicial economy is not necessarily 
compromised by intervention.238 Again, if the intervenor has 
shown a valid interest, which could be impaired by the resolution, 
the court should grant intervention as of right absent valid grounds 
for exclusion.239 
231. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 277. 
232. [d. 
233. FED. R. elV. P. 24(a)(2). 
234. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 276-77. 
235. [d. at 277. 
236. [d. at 278 (discussing how Rule 24(a)(2) works with Rule 19, or the joinder 
of necessary parties, to keep the process from suffering when relevant concerns are not 
represented). 
237. [d. at 277. 
238. [d. at 279 (excepting when participation would just duplicate the interests of 
existing parties and therefore add nothing to the truthseeking function). 
239. [d. 
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B. Abandoning the Parens Patriae Presumption 
The analysis also examines the validity of the presumption that 
the government is adequately representing an intervening private 
party, which is the root of the circuit split.240 Arguably, the pre­
sumption represents circular logic. In light of the intent of Rule 
24(a)(2), the critical issue is whether the government adequately 
represents the same interests as the intervenor. Yet, by relying 
upon the parens patriae doctrine, the court does not really examine 
the intervenor's interest; it presumes that the government's repre­
sentation is adequate simply because it is the government.241 If the 
courts use a standard that incorporates all the circumstances of a 
case,242 taking into consideration the Rule 24(a)(2) requirement to 
prove the adequacy of representation to facilitate intervention,243 
this presumption is neither required nor helpful. 
The parens patriae doctrine that some circuits have used to 
create the higher standard244 does not require a de facto acceptance 
of adequate representation. The parens patriae doctrine pertains to 
whether the government is acting in its sovereign capacity, i.e., pro­
tecting a matter of public welfare and representing the public in 
general. If the government is not acting in its sovereign capacity, 
the doctrine is not applicable and there would be no presumption of 
adequate representation.245 However, parens patriae is at odds 
with the nature of the difference in interests; for the government to 
represent both the public interest in a statute and the private inter­
240. See supra notes 60-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the early 
development of the parens patriae doctrine in this context. 
241. See, e.g., Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 138 F. 
Supp. 2d 593, 601 (M.D.Pa. 2001) (describing an example of the presumption where the 
intervenor's interests are not identical to the government's but they overlap, yet there is 
no further examination of where the interests may diverge). 
242. See Ruthardt v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 2d 232, 245 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(emphasizing that the four elements of Rule 24(a)(2) should be read together and in 
keeping with a "commonsense view of the overall litigation") (quoting Public Servo CO. 
V. Patch, 136 F.3d 197,204 (1st Cir. 1998». 
243. See supra Part III.A. 
244. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 300 ("Courts that apply the presumption typically 
rely on the doctrine of 'parens patriae.'''). 
245. See Mausolf V. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that 
the parens patriae doctrine does not apply in every case where the government is a 
party because the interest may not be a matter of sovereign interest; therefore, there 
would be no reason to think that the government would represent it); Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa Indians V. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the intervenor was not asserting a matter involving sovereign interest because its nar­
rower interest in the land was not subsumed into the general public interest that the 
government was charged with representing). 
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est of those it regulates is indeed an impossible task.246 The pre­
sumption allows the courts to only loosely examine the 
circumstances of the cases to determine the capacity in which the 
government is operating.247 Yet, this examination is vital to full ad­
judication of all potential issues. 
There is a distinction between the "quasi-sovereign" interests 
of the state that fall under parens patriae and the narrower interests 
of individuals that do not come within the doctrine.248 A govern­
ment entity's "quasi-sovereign" interests include, but are not lim­
ited to, interests in the health and welfare, both physical and 
economic, of its citizens.249 Since governments must represent all 
their citizens equally, they may have to compromise or change posi­
tions in a manner that does not benefit the individual concerns of 
the intervenor.25o Thus, if the intervenor asserts an interest that is 
private or identifiably distinct from the general public interest, Rule 
24(a)(2) and Trbovich indicate that intervention should be allowed 
with a minimal burden.251 
246. Nat'l Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381, 383 (10th 
Cir. 1977) ("Other cases have recognized the inadequacy of governmental representa­
tion of the interests of private parties."); see, e.g. Cabot LNG Corp. v. Puerto Rico Elec. 
Power Auth., 162 F.R.D. 427, 431 (D. Puerto Rico 1995) ("[existing party] is a govern­
ment agency and therefore, cannot adequately represent private interests in litigation"). 
247. See Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 197 
F.3d 560, 566-67 (1st Cir. 1999) ("But, perhaps as a counterweight to the broad reading 
of 'interest,' the courts have been quite ready to presume that a government defendant 
will 'adequately represent' the interests of all private defenders of the statute or regula­
tion unless there is a showing to the contrary."). 
248. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 300. 
249. Id. at 301. 
250. Id. at 303. "Public entities are also susceptible to agency capture and ideo­
logical bias. . . . A presumption of adequate representation by government ignores 
those realities or, at least, improperly adds to the burden already facing applicants in 
those circumstances." Id. at 303 n.21O; see also Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 
188 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that when a citizen's interests are different from the public's 
at large, the parens patriae should not be expected to represent them); Sierra Club v. 
Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing how the government must re­
present the broad public interest, from which the economic concerns of the timber in­
dustry are distinguishable); Dimond v. Dist. of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (describing the inadequacy of government representation of private parties be­
cause of its duty to represent the general public interest); United States v. Hooker 
Chern. & Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451, 457 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), affd 749 F.2d 968 
(2d Cir. 1984) (stating that courts often depart from the parens patriae doctrine when 
the suit involves a challenge to government regulations and private entities benefiting 
from the regulations are seeking to intervene as defendants). 
251. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 303 (indicating that Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirement of 
a separate and distinct interest in the subject matter fulfills the burden that the inter­
venor's interests are independent from the general public interest pursued by the gov­
ernment as parens patriae). 
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The circuit split, and resulting spectrum of standards and appli­
cation of this aspect of Rule 24, is in part due to the linear history of 
the case law. In this line of cases, the issue of adequate representa­
tion arises in two different circumstances where the government is 
involved.252 Several of the cases were based on public law, in which 
the government acted to protect the public good, such as the envi­
ronment or resource rights.253 The courts considered the parens pa­
triae doctrine in the context of whether the government was acting 
in its sovereign capacity and whether the intervenor had an interest 
subsumed in the public interest, as when an intervenor's rights to 
use public land are indistinguishable from the rest of the state's 
citizens. 
Then, later decisions borrowed the presumption from these 
cases and applied it to circumstances in which the government was 
protecting a law as a defendant and the intervenor was within the 
industry regulated by that law.254 While the government is still act­
ing to uphold a law designed to protect some aspect of public wel­
fare, the government's relationship with the intervenor is one of 
regulation rather than general protection. The distinction is impor­
tant since the line of case law and its reasoning is intermingled. Yet, 
the regulatory circumstance presents a more sharply distinguisha­
ble, usually economic, interest that is in danger of being ignored as 
a result of the presumption borrowed from public lawsuits. 
When the court uses a presumption of adequate interest, where 
the governmental entity is the regulator of the intervenor, the pre­
sumption goes beyond the intent of Rule 24(a)(2).255 In addition, 
the courts adopting the presumption of a higher standard involving 
252. See supra Part I, II for the history of cases in this line. 
253. See Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1998) ("A gov­
ernment entity charged by law with representing a national policy is presumed adequate 
for the task, particularly when the concerns of the proposed intervenor, e.g., a 'public 
interest' group, closely parallel those of the public agency.") (citation omitted); Mausolf 
v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996) ("But when one of the parties is an arm or 
agency of the government, and the case concerns a matter of 'sovereign interest,' the 
bar is raised ...."); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 
1000, 1001 (8th Cir. 1993) (using language describing the government presumption to 
protect management of game and fish under state law). 
254. Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 2d 593, 
601 (Pa. M.D. 2001) (citing Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972); Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alco­
holic Beverages Control Comm'n, 197 F.3d 560, 566 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Pub. Servo 
Co. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197,207 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303). 
255. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 298-99 ("It defies reason to conclude that [Trbo­
vich's] rationale would countenance a heightened adequacy standard for suits involving 
government. "). 
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government entities do not fully explain where they derived the 
presumption from, despite the fact that Trbovich was a decision re­
garding representation by a governmental entity.256 The presump­
tion appears to have derived from cases in which the government 
was representing environmental laws-protecting the "com­
mons"-applicable to regulated industries. The government's rep­
resentation of the public's interests is more likely to conflict with 
private interests in circumstances where a group of citizens chal­
lenge the validity of laws or regulations, and the citizens benefiting 
from the laws attempt to intervene to assert their own individual 
interests.257 
Presuming adequate representation to create a higher standard 
when the government is involved conflicts with the fundamental 
concepts of Rule 24(a)(2).258 Specifically, using the doctrine to cre­
ate a higher standard shifts the focus away from the essential ques­
tion. That question is not whether the government is one of the 
parties, but whether the interests of the existing governmental party 
and the intervenor are the same. 
On the other hand, allowing liberal intervention, unless clearly 
redundant, is in keeping with Rule 24(a)(2), the Supreme Court de­
cision in Trbovich, and many federal circuit courts' holdings.259 The 
proposed analytical framework also incorporates the policy that the 
intervenor is the best judge of whether its interests are being ade­
quately represented.260 When a regUlating governmental agency is 
presumed to be adequately representing those it regulates, not only 
is the intervenor's interest potentially infringed upon, its voice is 
effectively silenced, save for the possibility of amicus status and its 
restricted contributions.261 Since the court has only limited means 
to ascertain whether the interest is distinct, unprotected, and 
should be heard before intervention is allowed, the fact that the 
intervenor felt it necessary to participate in the suit should speak 
256. Id. at 299 (discussing the decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th 
Cir. 1994), where the court cited that the burden is minimal but higher when the repre­
sentation is by the government without indicating why that should be so). 
257. Id. at 314; MOORE, supra note 178, at 24-48. 
258. See supra Part I.A; infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of what Rule 24(a)(2) 
is supposed to accomplish and its core concepts. 
259. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text. 
260. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 354 (explaining that the applicant for interven­
tion is the best judge of whether the representation is adequate). 
261. The other two criteria for Rule 24(a)(2) involve the intervenor having an 
interest that is being impeded. To deny intervention through the parens patriae concept 
is to leave the intervenor with an impeded interest that mayor may not be defended. 
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for itself.262 
Upon examination, abandoning the presumption and employ­
ing an analysis of the distinct circumstances and interests in each 
case is clearly necessary. The government could uphold a chal­
lenged law regulating the intervenor but have an interest that di­
verges from that of the intervenor.263 Conversely, the government 
and the intervenor could have closely aligned economic interests, 
making a simple difference in tactics insufficient to require separate 
representation.264 As several cases have illustrated, the govern­
ment could be charged with representing a much broader interest 
than the narrower, more economic interest of the intervenor, a task 
some courts have deemed an "impossible task" on its face.265 The 
courts should keep this difference in sharp focus and protect it from 
getting brushed aside in determining whether the government is 
acting in a sovereign capacity. The courts cannot use a presumption 
that the government is adequately representing the interests of the 
intervenor without hampering intervention as it was designed to 
work. 
Absent the presumption, the courts must clearly identify and 
examine the interests. The degree to which the interests overlap or 
contradict one another is key to whether to allow intervention. 
C. The Analytical Framework 
The proposed analytical framework simplifies the process that 
the courts use to determine adequate representation when the go v­
262. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.lO (1972) (stating 
that showing required for inadequate representation should be minimal); WRIGHT, 
supra note 19 (recalling the argument, albeit un adopted, during the amending of Rule 
24 that the intervenor should always be allowed to intervene if he or she was willing to 
participate and pay for the expense); Shapiro, supra note 31, at 748 (advocating that the 
court should give due fairness to hearing the intervenor on a matter important to him or 
her, and on the contribution he or she could make to the court's understanding of the 
issue). 
263. See Linton v. Comm'r of Health & Env't, 973 F.2d 1311, 1319-20 (6th Cir. 
1992) (regulating the industry and trying to uphold the law, but since the government 
has an economic interest in the intervenors as well, the interests are inherently inconsis­
tent); see also Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964,972 (3d Cir. 1998); Mausolf v. 
Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1996). 
264. See Maine v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 262 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) 
("[D]ifference in tactics ... does not necessarily an inadequacy make."); Daggett v. 
Comm'n on Gov't Ethics and Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999) (dif­
ference in tactics not enough). 
265. See, e.g., Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1265 (10th Cir. 
2001) (citing Nat'l Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 564 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 
1977». 
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ernment is already a party and an entity it regulates is trying to 
intervene. First, the intervenor must define its individual interest 
for the court as distinct from the general interest the government is 
representing. Second, the court should determine the differences 
between these interests in order to apply the appropriate standard 
for showing whether the existing representation is adequate. Spe­
cifically, the court should decide whether the interests are adverse 
or not encompassed at all, identical, or just similar. Finally, if inter­
vention is inappropriate, the court should consider alternatives to 
intervention to hear the proposed intervenor's voice in the 
proceedings. . 
1. Defining the Interest 
The nature of the interest is the starting point of any analysis of 
intervention.266 The court must ascertain the interests of both par­
ties and examine such interests to determine whether they differ. 
Fortunately, Rule 24(a)(2) already requires a definition of the inter­
est before proceeding to the adequate representation require­
ment.267 Preliminarily, the intervening parties must show that they 
have an interest in the proceedings that rises to the level of being 
directly affected by the disposition.268 
Further, the court must understand the government's repre­
sented interest in order to make a comparison. The party that 
needs to define this interest for the court depends on whether or 
not there has been a burden shift pursuant to the amendments to 
Rule 24(a)(2).269 If there has been a burden shift, then after the 
intervenor has fulfilled the first two requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), 
the government is responsible for demonstrating that the repre­
sented interest already encompasses the intervenor's interest, and 
that the government can adequately represent both. If the burden 
266. WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 318 ("The most important factor in determining 
adequacy of representation is how the interest of the absentee compares with the inter­
ests of the present parties.") (footnote omitted). 
267. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2). 
268. Id. 
269. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (describing the shift 
in wording after the 1966 amendment of Rule 24 as not changing the standard for inter­
vention, but underscoring "the burden is on those opposing intervention to show the 
adequacy of the existing representation" and making it more liberal); WRIGHT, supra 
note 19, at 314 (describing the change in wording of Rule 24 after the 1966 amendment 
as clearly shifting the burden of persuasion to allow in the intervenor unless the court is 
persuaded that representation is adequate); Shapiro, supra note 31, at 729. But see 
Kennedy, supra note 21, at 353-54. 
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remains on the intervenor to show that it should be let in only if the 
existing representation may be inadequate, then the intervenor 
must define the governmental interest to show that its interest is 
distinct from the government's interest such that the government 
cannot adequately represent both. 
The courts have presented valid arguments that the 1966 
amendments to Rule 24 incorporated a burden shift.270 Factors that 
contribute to these arguments are the change in wording, the rela­
tionship between Rule 24 and Rules 19271 and 23,272 the general 
liberalization of Rule 24, and a practical consideration of who could 
best bear the burden.273 Although most courts have not adopted a 
shift in burden,274 these factors have merit if the framework is more 
closely aligned with the intent of Rule 24(a)(2). Given these con­
siderations, and with a shift in burdens depending on how the inter­
ests relate, the burden should remain on the intervenor except 
where the intervenor has demonstrated a different interest. Since 
intervention should be liberally allowed, and the intervenor is the 
best judge of whether the government is adequately representing its 
interest,275 the government must prove that it is in fact an adequate 
representative in cases where adversity is shown initially. 
2. Differences Between Interests 
In order to employ a clear analysis, the intervenor's and the 
government's interests can be grouped into three categories with 
different standards applying to each category. The interests can be 
adverse or not represented at all, identical, or similar but not the 
same.276 
If the interests are adverse, or not represented at all, the repre­
sentation is clearly inadequate and the court should apply the most 
minimal burden.277 If they are identical, then the court should re­
quire a compelling showing to prove inadequate representation be­
cause this category is the most likely to be adequately 
represented.278 Lastly, if the interests are similar but differ in sig­
270. 26 FED. PROC. § 59:300, at 226 (1984). 
271. FED. R. CIv. P. 19 (Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication). 
272. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Class Actions). 
273. 26 FED. PROC. § 59:300 (1984). 
274. Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that burden shift 
has not been adopted by most courts). 
275. 26 FED. PROC. § 59:300 (1984). 
276. 26 FED. PROC. § 59:303, at 228 (1999). 
277. [d. 
278. WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 318-19. 
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nificant ways, the court should make a discriminating judgment on 
the facts using a minimal burden; the court should allow interven­
tion unless the existing party is clearly providing adequate 
representation.279 
a. Adverse Interests 
If the intervenor has an interest adverse to the interests the 
government represents, or does not represent at all, the court 
should allow intervention after a minimal showing. Because the 
standard is lowered in these circumstances, the interest would have 
to rise to the level of actual adversity or proven failure to represent 
the existing interests. Although not an exclusive list,280 the three­
point test devised by Justice (then Judge) Blackmun provides a use­
ful framework for analyzing whether the interests are, in fact, ad­
verse.281 According to the three-point test, adversity of interest, 
collusion with an opposing party, or nonfeasance by the existing 
governmental party would allow a virtually per se intervention.282 
Because intervention would be virtually per se, the burden would 
shift to the government to prove that its representation was in fact 
adequate. 
b. Identical Interests 
If the interests are identical, the court should allow interven­
tion only if there is a strong showing of inadequate representa­
tion.283 It would be adverse to Rule 24(a)(2) to allow intervention 
when the interest is truly adequately represented; if the interests 
are indeed identical, then the government would be adequately rep­
resenting the proposed intervenor. Otherwise, the intervening par­
ties would have little to offer and could obstruct the proceedings. 
Since the underlying objective of the suit is generally a matter of 
public concern, the differences cannot be superficial because that 
would overload the courts and hinder judicial administration. Dif­
ferences in interest and scope should be treated with the minimal 
279. Id. 
280. Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d 
104, 111 (1st Cir. 1999). 
281. Id.; Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S.G. Phillips Corp., 610 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 
1979). 
282. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 155-56 
(1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 
1962). 
283. 26 FED. PROC. § 59:303 (1984). 
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burden to give the intervenors the right to defend their own inter­
ests and add to the overall knowledge and understanding of the 
court, but the intervenor has the burden to prove inadequate 
representation. 
c. Similar Interests 
Regulated parties trying to intervene with their regulators are 
doing so in an area that falls between private and public law. Public 
law concerns subject matter that is about public policy, not "be­
tween private individuals about private rights."284 Yet, the inter­
venor is often asserting a private right in a suit about enforcement 
of statutes or regulations. The government's representation of the 
public interest could be in sharp contrast, yet not necessarily ad­
verse, to the private interests of the regulated party seeking to in­
tervene.285 Therefore, the court should examine intervenor's 
interests to determine where they diverge from the public interest, 
not where they overlap. On the other hand, the intervenor's inter­
est is sometimes not a private interest at all, but rather a public one 
pursued by a private entity.286 If there is unity of purpose, the in­
tervenor has to show that it will contribute meaningfully to the suit 
and would otherwise be left without representation for its particular 
interest with a tangible or predictable showing.287 
When a government agency is charged with representing a 
public interest, into which the intervenor falls, but the intervenor is 
claiming an interest different from the public interest, representa­
tion may be inadequate despite an overall similarity in interests. If 
a regulated organization is trying to intervene, its interest is often 
trying to uphold or strengthen a statute that is being challenged by 
those affected. The agency is charged with upholding the statute 
and is likely to do so vigorously. Therefore, the interests appear 
very similar at the outset. When interests are similar, "a discrimi­
284. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 274-75 (quoting from Abram Chayes, The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1302 (1976». 
285. [d. at 314 (specifying that this is often the case "when one group of citizens 
sues the government challenging ... laws or regulations and [those] who benefit from 
[the] laws or regulations wish to intervene and assert their own, particular interests 
rather than the general, public good"). 
286. See United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982) (rul­
ing that the government entity and the intervenor have the same ultimate goal of up­
holding the statute, despite the intervenor having a more specialized interest due to 
environmental concerns, so the intervenor is essentially asserting a public, rather than 
private interest). 
287. Ruthardt v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 2d 232, 245 (D. Mass. 2001). 
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nating judgment is required based on the circumstances of the par­
ticular case, but [intervention] ... should be allowed ... unless it is 
clear that the party will provide adequate representation for the ab­
sentee."288 The key is to pinpoint exactly where the interests di­
verge, not where they overlap, and to keep from undervaluing that 
difference.289 The circuits have found various rationales for discuss­
ing the manner in which the interests are different. 
The interests, albeit similar, may differ in scope. This means 
that the interests may not coincide enough to show adequate repre­
sentation.290 Differences in scope can occur when the government 
has a broad public interest in enforcing a statute and the intervenor 
has an interest in how upholding the statute affects its particular 
industry291 or the private interests of individuals within the inter­
vening organization.292 Characterizing the interests as different in 
scope focuses attention on the "impossible task" that the govern­
ment has in representing both the general public good and the nar­
rower economic interests of the intervenor. 
Some courts have chosen instead to classify the private inter­
ests of individuals or organizations as inherently different, rather 
than just narrower in scope. The interests can differ even when the 
ultimate objective is the same. For example, if an environmental 
group or landowner is seeking to intervene in an action brought 
against the government to challenge an environmental statute, the 
government is charged with representing all of the public, industry 
included. Within the goal of defending the statute, the intervenor's 
interest is not just narrower in scope, it differs from the govern­
ment's because the group may advocate a higher standard of con­
trol, a different level of compromise, or even a different focus on 
288. WRIGHT, supra note 19, at § 1909; 26 FED. PROC. L.ED. PARTIES § 59:303; 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 983 F.2d 211, 216 (11th 
Cir. 1993) ("Any doubt concerning the propriety of allowing intervention should be 
resolved in favor of the proposed intervenors because it allows the court to resolve all 
related disputes in a single action. "). 
289. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 304-05 (allowing intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) 
only requires a minimum burden and that burden is overcome where the intervenor's 
"interests diverge from, or conflict with, those of the movant."). 
290. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(stating that different scopes of interest can warrant intervention, particularly when the 
intervenor can provide a helpful supplement to the defense because of its more specific, 
technical knowledge). 
291. Id. 
292. Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1992) (il­
lustrating the economic interests of fishermen within the commercial fishing organiza­
tion trying to intervene). 
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what aspect of the statute is essential to protect.293 The intervenor 
wants something different than the government, not just to re­
present a narrower part of an overall objective. However, the inter­
venor cannot just disagree on legal strategy.294 If the intervenor's 
interests are subsumed in the public interest and are covered by the 
government's representation,the interests could be difficult to dis­
tinguish from each other. 
In the area of law where the governmental entity directly regu­
lates private businesses or organizations,295 the interest of the inter­
venor is perhaps more easily distinguishable from that of the 
government.296 The government entity is charged with representing 
broad public interests; the intervenors have a narrower, often pri­
marily economic, interest.297 Again, the determination of whether 
the interests diverge sufficiently to require separate representation 
hinges on the type of interest.298 
If the interests are similar, in that the differences primarily lie 
in legal strategy,299 facts, or undefined future confiicts,3°O then the 
293. See Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding inade­
quate representation because the interests of the intervenor may not coincide, even if 
they are in common at the time, and the state has an independent interest in maintain­
ing and allocating natural resources); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1304 (8th Cir. 
1996) ("Government's interest in promoting recreational activity and tourism in the 
Park, an interest many citizens share, may be adverse to the Association's conservation 
interests, interests also shared by many."); cf Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1996) ("More is needed than a presumption of 
inadequacy based on the diversity of the Department's interests ...."). 
294. Jenkins, supra note 38, at 305. 
295. See generally Linton v. Comm'r of Health & Env't, 973 F.2d 1311, 1319-20 
(6th Cir. 1992) (defining interests of state as both regulator and purchaser of inter­
venor's services). 
296. See Dimond v. Dist. of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (de­
termining that a private corporate entity has a more narrow, parochial, financial interest 
not shared by the public because it would be economically affected if the court's deci­
sion is retroactive and the state would not). 
297. See Shapiro, supra note 31, at 737 (seeking intervention when a private per­
son has no independent legal claim but has an identifiable interest, usually economic, 
that differentiates him or her from the general public); Jenkins, supra note 38, at 298. 
298. See Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing a test for 
demonstrating different interests sufficient to show inadequate representation as: 1) are 
the interests of the intervenor similar enough to the party that the legal arguments 
would be the same; 2) is the existing party willing and capable of making those argu­
ments; and 3) if allowed to intervene, would the intervenor add a necessary element not 
currently covered). 
299. See Jenkins, supra note 38, at 305-06 (demonstrating inadequate representa­
tion may require more than disagreement in tactics, but the minimal requirement is 
satisfied when the interests diverge or conflict). 
300. Compare Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 
1000-01 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding the future potential for conflict enough to satisfy bur­
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court must determine if the differences are real or negligible.30l In­

tervention can sacrifice judicial expediency and economy; indeed, 

the court and the original parties pay the costs. Both, therefore, 

have an interest in protecting the integrity of the original suipo2 If 

the intervenor's interests are fundamentally different, such as eco­

nomic, the court should allow intervention. If they are negligibly 

different, they may be subsumed into the public interest that the 

government represents. Because the interests are different, or di­
, verge in some way, the court should allow intervention once the 

intervenor has shown a tangible difference in interest that is not 

represented. 
Therefore, the intervenors must present their interests with the 
differences clarified for the court. The court should determine the 
nature of the differences and whether they are real. The court 
should then apply either a minimal burden for different interests, a 
higher burden for subsumed interests, or a per se standard for di­
rectly adverse or non-existent representation with a burden shift to 
the existing party to show adequate representation. If the court de­
termines that the differences exist but are slight and are primarily 
part of the public interest, or that they are similar and the minimal 
burden is not overcome, it can employ alternatives to intervention. 
The alternatives allow the proposed intervenor to present the inter­
est without intervening. 
D. Alternatives to Intervention 
The courts can include an intervenor's views without allowing 
intervention as of right as full parties. The Advisory Committee for 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended the court to modify 
intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) as necessary without 
den of inadequate representation) with Pub. Servo Co. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197,208 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (refusing to infer inadequate representation from unproven potential for fu­
ture conflict). 
301. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 377 (listing factors to consider for court's deci­
sion on whether to allow intervention, including effectiveness of remedies if interven­
tion is denied, nature of interest, impact on jurisdiction if allowed, and impact on 
administration of justice if allowed). 
302. Many of the early cases under the original Rule 24 were anti-trust cases ap­
pealed directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act, and the Supreme 
Court was less receptive to non-government parties getting involved in the actions for 
reasons of judicial efficiency. Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation; The 
Environmental Paradigm, 78 WASH. u.L.Q. 215,248 (2000). Also, in the government­
initiated antitrust suits, the Court held that intervention by private parties was inappro­
priate because it "would entail questioning the wisdom of the government's policy deci­
sions." Id. at 252. 
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expressing exactly how or in what circumstances.303 For example, 
the court can limit the intervenor's ability to present witnesses or 
restrict its discovery rights.304 If the court denies intervention as of 
right but allows permissive intervention, the intervenors are still 
parties, even if the order limits their participation, and they can ap­
peal a final judgment.305 Even if the intervenors are allowed in to 
present their views on the consent decree, the original parties can 
leave them out of settlement negotiations.306 
If the court decides that the interests are different but not spe­
cialized or distinct enough to warrant intervention, it could also al­
low the intervenor to participate in some capacity as amicus 
curiae.307 While this fulfills part of the intervenor's purpose in hav­
ing its voice heard, the concern remains that the interest is not ade­
quately protected. Amicus curiae is a common law concept that 
allows the proposed intervenor to assert interests when an entity is 
unable to participate as a party in a lawsuit, such as when interven­
tion has been denied.308 The court can allow different kinds of ami­
cus and "levels" of participation in much the same way as 
intervention.309 When the intervenor is a private party, for exam­
ple, the court can limit its role to providing information, raising 
issues potentially overlooked by the parties, filling in factual infor­
mation, and raising possible implications of the court's decision.310 
Historically, an amicus curiae is a party who is allowed into the 
court to provide impartial information on the law if there is doubt 
303. Appel, supra note 302, at 278 ("[ejourt had the discretion to limit its grant 
of intervention ... the committee provided no authority for this reference. Neverthe­
less, more and more courts have granted limited forms of intervention in which the 
intervenor is not permitted to present witnesses or is limited in its discovery rights."); 
see also United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 420 (D. Minn. 1972) 
(granting limited form of intervention for multiple intervening parties). 
304. Appel, supra note 302, at 278 ("[I]f a district court grants a limited form of 
intervention, the intervenor cannot appeal that decision until final judgment in the 
case."). 
305. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480, U.S. 370, 375-76 (1987) 
(stating that intervenors either of right or permissive have the right to appeal an ad­
verse final judgment by a trial court so it can challenge the intervention of right denial 
and the limitations put on permissive intervention at the appeals court after the trial). 
306. Appel, supra note 302, at 278-79 (excluding the intervenors because an inter­
venor cannot block the settlement or consent decree by withholding its consent). 
307. Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does 
the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U.L. REv. 1243, 1258 (Summer 1992). 
308. [d. at 1291. 
309. [d. at 1258-59. 
310. [d. at 1258-60. 
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about it, particularly in public litigation.311 It was not an adver­
sarial party in the suit, but some courts have moved away from the 
impartial informational purpose and granted limited adversarial 
powers to the amici.312 Amicus curiae are never full parties, how­
ever, and are usually barred from starting legal proceedings, filing 
pleadings, or controlling the adversarial side of the controversy.313 
In order to qualify as parties, the court would have to grant inter­
vention under Rule 24; the two statuses should not be confused.314 
Regardless of its flexibility, amicus curiae should be used only 
when the court is certain that the interests do not differ materially 
enough to warrant intervention but are not subsumed in the overall 
objective. The court should not grant amicus status as a means of 
allowing partial intervention when the court is not clear whether 
the representation is adequate and there appears to be a difference 
in interests. Further, the court should not grant amicus status to 
allow regulated intervenors to inform the court of a different inter­
est under parens patriae while denying actual intervention. The 
court, using the minimal burden and the policy that the intervenor 
is the best judge of adequate representation, should determine 
whether intervention is appropriate before considering amicus 
curiae.315 
CONCLUSION 
The courts must navigate the bewildering array of tests, analyt­
ical frameworks, and standards they have developed when deciding 
motions for intervention. To aid in navigating, courts should return 
to the fundamental questions being asked when a party is seeking 
to intervene with the government that regulates it or its interests. 
The court should identify the interests of the parties and ascertain 
whether they diverge. Unless the interests are identical or sub­
sumed, courts should employ a minimal burden of showing when 
representation is inadequate. In cases where the court cannot de­
311. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 164 (6th Cir. 1991). 
312. Id. at 165. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. ("The intent and purpose of the Federal Rules should not be evaded by 
acts of judicial legerdemain."). 
315. The line between amicus curiae and intervenor is not always a clear one, and 
the courts should use both appropriately since they entail different rights and privileges. 
See Lowman, supra note 307, at 1255-56; see also Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae: 
American Development of English Institutions, 16 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 1017, 1018 
(1967) (asserting that elevating amici to a more party-like status by granting them more 
powers blurs the line between amici and intervenor). 
175 2002] PRESUMED REPRESENTED 
termine the differences, and the court decides that the intervenor 
has information to contribute, amicus curiae can provide a voice for 
the interest. The doctrine of parens patriae should only apply in 
circumstances where the state is truly acting in its sovereign capac­
ity. Ultimately, the history of Rule 24(a)(2) and decisions involving 
it support a more liberal approach to intervention rather than a. 
more restrictive one. 
Katharine Goepp 
